How fast can an icbm travel

Such an interceptor would be launched by command on the basis of DSP data, without there ever having been a radar detection of the ICBM. Fitted with a sensor capable of detecting the missile flame, it could direct its limited field of view in the direction commanded according to the data from DSP, and accelerate toward a predicted intercept point.

The prediction would need continued refinement, by observation from the interceptor of the current position of the ICBM booster. But the interceptor would have to be launched from a site sufficiently close and have sufficiently high performance in order to reach the missile while it was still burning. Furthermore, the interceptor could not simply home on the flame but in the late stages of intercept would need to look "ahead" of the flame, in order to strike the solid missile and not sail harmlessly through the tenuous flame.

This could be done either by blind reckoning because of the known shape of the flame, or by actual detection of the solid missile with a proper design of the interceptor seeker. Specifically, it should be possible to use an interceptor of the same gross launch weight as the GBI of the NMD program about 14 tons, with A simple calculation shows that the sea-based interceptor could be deployed as much as km downrange from the launch site and still be able to catch the ICBM while it is still burning.

Because the interceptor must rise vertically in the lower atmosphere, it probably moves only about km toward its target while it is burning, and then in the remaining seconds moves some km. So in the burn time of the ICBM, the interceptor can reach out a total of km from its launch site. The interceptor could be deployed km east or west of the ICBM trajectory, about km downrange.

So there is plenty of room for U. The ships need have no missile-tracking radars. Such a sea-based boost-phase intercept system is not compliant with the ABM Treaty; but Russia and the three other parties to the Treaty might well agree to a specific exception, especially if this were combined with progress on lower missile levels in Russia and the United States.

My own judgment is that the ABM treaty plays a valuable role in U. Alternatively, Russia and the U. It is a chemical oxygen-iodine laser mounted in a Boeing aircraft that has the task of focussing through the turbulent atmosphere further disturbed by the passage of the laser beam itself in order to weaken or melt the structure on a missile during boost phase.

The ABL laser operates at 1. The ABL will operate at an altitude of 13 km-- most of the time above the clouds and, assuming that the laser works as planned and that laser beam propagation is as assumed, Forden assesses the range for "decisive engagement" from km for the al-Husayn to km for the North Korean Nodong km-range missile.

This assumes that a substantial arc of the missile skin must be softened so that the missile collapses. For a less catastrophic criterion, Forden estimates the range limit from the missile launch point to be km, and km or more for an ICBM assuming the ABL downrange from the ICBM launch and so can attack at closer range.

He notes that 5 G. This phase has no particular vulnerabilities and will not be further discussed. If one catches the bus toward the end of its maneuvers, one can counter in this way only a fraction of the RVs. Catching it at the beginning seems less likely than doing the boost-phase intercept. RVs falling through space are on a highly predictable trajectory, so that repeated radar observation, for instance, can refine that trajectory and contribute to the intercept capability.

Intercept of a single RV is simpler with a nuclear-armed interceptor, with an effective kill range measured in kilometers. Several long-range weapons effects can be important in this regard 6 -- x-ray-induced blowoff of the external surface drives a shock into the material of the RV and can damage the warhead by "spall" or by deformation of the structure; the fissionable material can be melted by neutrons from the interceptor thermonuclear warhead.

Large and powerful radars are required to see a reentry vehicle at ranges of several thousand km, and such have long been deployed in the ballistic missile early warning system BMEWS in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Britain. The criterion is simply that the radar direct enough energy on the RV within the required search time for the reflected energy to the radar to exceed thermal noise. Radar and detection theory are highly evolved and can take into account the fact that reentry vehicles do not suddenly appear in space.

The RVs have an easy ride through the vacuum of space, and an ICBM launch for which the RVs do not wish to be seen or identified can provide a vast amount of clutter or chaff 6 Bethe, H. Vast numbers of such dipoles can be formed of metal, glass, or carbon fibers with a metal coat, and can thus provide a substantial radar return that masks real RVs.

Similar radar clutter can be provided by inflated balloons of metal-coated plastic, and, for good measure, one can put a balloon around the RV itself-- a simple form of "antisimulation" to enable the RV to simulate a decoy that is easy to make.

The other approach to wide-field detection of RVs in space is via their thermal infrared radiation. The focal plane could be cooled to liquid hydrogen temperature to reduce the self-generated "noise" from thermal radiation in the detector itself.

In the modern era, one can use a "staring" array so that longer integration times are possible, although the motion of the light source across the visual field because of relative motion of the RV and the observer limits the integration time that can be used in this simple fashion. Such telescopes are planned to be mounted eventually on the space-based infrared system in low-Earth orbit SBIRS-low which would observe in the thermal ir looking at warheads against the black background of space.

Of course many stars will be observed, but they are readily discriminated from warheads because they do not move. Detection of an RV from two or more satellites will fix it in space at the intersection of the two lines of sight, so that an interceptor can be directed accurately toward the RV which is moving in a Keplerian orbit.

As the interceptor approaches, even a relatively crude ir telescope in the interceptor will be able to detect the RV. Carter and D. Schwartz, Eds. The Brookings Institution, This volume is an accessible compilation of technical and strategic aspects of BMD.

The attached charts 8 show some of the elements involved in the modeling of the performance of an exoatmospheric kill vehicle EKV as a function of the assumed initial offset of the RV the "impact parameter". Technically, intercept within the atmosphere is easier for the defense because the ICBM warheads are highly visible to radar and to optical sensors, because of the very hot "wake" produced by the Mach RV as it enters the atmosphere. Balloons and light chaff 9 are no longer effective against sensors, because they will be retarded or destroyed on reentry.

Within the atmosphere it is more difficult to make survivable and effective decoys that match the deceleration of the RV containing a nuclear warhead.

And the interceptor can undertake much more aggressive maneuvers by aerodynamic force than it could conveniently with rocket propulsion in space. On the other hand, the RV is decelerating rapidly rather than existing in a well-defined orbit; it may also be maneuvering violently, whether intentionally or not. Sensors on the interceptor are much more difficult, since its high speed through the atmosphere requires heat resistant windows and adds greatly to the background in detecting infrared from the RV.

Radars must be more closely spaced to see RVs down to altitudes of reentry, and interceptors cannot drive out hundreds or thousands of km through the atmosphere.

However, it could also strengthen deterrence. This concerns dual-capable systems, that is, systems with both conventional and nuclear capabilities, for example, the Kinzhal. Bosbotinis also explained that dual-capable systems raise the issue of discrimination: how does one know if the incoming threat is conventional or nuclear?

In the context of hypersonic threats, this is compounded by the reduced time available to decision-makers to respond to an incoming threat. Moreover, the development of submarine-launched hypersonic missiles would raise the potential threat — real or perceived — of attempted decapitation strikes, utilising the combination of the inherent stealth of a nuclear-powered submarine and the speed of a hypersonic missile.

There have been suggestions, including from senior US military officials, that the US has fallen behind Russia and China in the race for hypersonic missiles. This is to an extent, true.

With regards to current US projects, Bosbotinis says the US has not focused to the same extent as Russia and China on the operational deployment of hypersonic capabilities.

That said, the US can be accused of relying too heavily on its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier groups to project power. Russia and China will have the capability the hit carrier groups with hypersonic missiles before they can get in operational range to launch airstrikes, as the upcoming F stealth fighter jets have a combat radius of miles, meanwhile hypersonic missiles potentially have a range in excess of 1, miles.

Current supersonic missiles, such as BrahMos, have a range of around miles, but this can be increased with glide vehicles, meaning that carriers will have to move dangerously close to hostile territory to be effective. It is clear that the US is aiming to bridge the gap with regards to missile technology — a gap which has widened over the last decade as Russia and China have poured resources into their respective hypersonic projects. Since , the Royal Navy and the French Navy have also been co-developing a hypersonic missile designed to replace the ageing Harpoon and Exocet respectively.

The missile, Perseus, is expected to feature an agile and stealthy airframe that is powered by a ramjet motor built around a high compact Continuous Detonation Wave Engine.

It is expected to come into service around China has a number of ongoing hypersonic projects. The nation is reportedly close to deploying a ballistic missile-launched hypersonic glide vehicle, the DF and has publicly exhibited a scramjet-powered missile, the Ling Yun.

Chinese operational doctrine calls for a weapon that would ward of US carrier groups, keeping them out of their operational range. The DF-ZF is a short to mid-range hypersonic missile glide vehicle and — when operational — would be able to largely mitigate any potential threat stemming from US carrier groups, fulfilling a long-term strategic goal without having to compete through naval strength.

In addition, China has also allegedly performed successful tests of the Starry Sky-2 hypersonic vehicle. The Starry Sky-2 can achieve a top speed of Mach 6 mph , switch direction mid-flight and can carry a payload consisting of either conventional warheads or nuclear weapons. It will likely take China another five years to make the weapon operational. Russian doctrine calls for short and long-range capability, as the Kremlin will have to contend with European NATO members as well as the US on the other side of the Atlantic.

In addition, Russia has deployed an operational hypersonic system, the KhM2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, capable reportedly of attaining a speed of Mach 10 and a range of miles, and is believed to be close to deploying a hypersonic cruise missile, the 3K22 Tsirkon.

The Tsirkon, a sea-and ground-launched missile is intended to attain high supersonic to hypersonic speeds, between Mach 4.

Russia has also developed an intercontinental ballistic missile-launched hypersonic glide vehicle, Avangard, which may enter service in Hypersonic missiles are so valuable because there is currently no operational or reliable method of intercepting them.

However, as defence technology progresses countermeasures will emerge. Technologies such as directed energy weapons, particle beams and other non-kinetic weapons will be likely candidates for an effective defence against hypersonic missiles.

Sineva reached a maximum range of 11,km during tests. The missile was inducted into service in and is expected to be operational until It can carry four warheads or ten kt warheads through independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

The three-stage missile is powered by liquid propellant engines, which use UDMH and Nitrogen Tetroxide as fuel and oxidiser respectively. Propulsion is provided by three solid-propellant rocket motors providing a range of over 7, miles 11,km.

The missile can travel at more than 13,mph. The ICBM can carry a single thermal nuclear warhead of 1,kt. The Dongfeng 31A can be launched from silos or transported on a transporter-erector-launcher TEL vehicle.

With a launch weight of 42t, the three-stage missile is propelled by solid-propellant rocket motors. The missile is launched either from silos or mobile launchers and can carry a single kt warhead. The The missile has been designed to withstand radiation, electromagnetic pulse and nuclear explosions at ranges exceeding m, as well as hits from high-energy lasers.

Minuteman III was the first missile in history to carry multiple warheads through a multiple re-entry vehicle MRV system. The missile weighs 76,lb 34,kg and is powered by three-stage solid fuel rocket motors. Its operational range is between 8,km and 10,km. An improved version with new nuclear warheads is scheduled for commissioning in